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DID WE AVOID HISTORICAL FAILURES OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT DURING THE
2008-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS?
DANIEL A. CRANE*
As an introduction to this Symposium, I offer an overview of the his-
tory of U.S. antitrust enforcement during economic crises. Having previ-
ously written an essay about the history of antitrust enforcement during
wars and economic downturns,' I will keep this historical narrative brief,
and add some modest observations about how things have gone this
time around.
I. HISTORYS LESSONS
During both economic crises and wars, times of severe national anxi-
ety, antitrust has taken a back seat to other political and regulatory
objectives. Antitrust enforcement has often been a political luxury good,
consumed only during periods of relative peace and prosperity.
In 1890, the Sherman Act's adoption kicked off the era of national
antitrust enforcement. Barely three years later, the panic of 1893 pro-
vided the first major test to the national appetite for antitrust enforce-
ment. Speculative overexpansion in the railroad industry was to blame
for the crisis-a steep recession-and the Robber Barons quickly rose to
fix the problem. Financier J.P. Morgan and his chief rival, the Kuhn,
Loeb finance house, snapped up bankrupt railroads out of receiver-
ship.2 By the turn of the century, the nation's railroads had been consol-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am very grateful to Marina Lao and Marc
Winerman for excellent editorial comments.
I Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Enforcement During National Crises: An Unhappy History,
GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'v, Autumn 2008 (Vol. 12, No. 1), https://www.competitionpol-
icyinternational.com/antitrust-enforcement-during-national-crises-an-unhappy-history/.
2 RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE
RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 67 (1990).
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idated into six large systems, primarily controlled by the houses of
Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb.3
Perhaps 1893 should not be included in the story: antitrust was still
young, and it was not even clear that the Sherman Act applied to merg-
ers. However, by Teddy Roosevelt's "trustbusting" days in the first dec-
ade of the 20th century, the reach of the Sherman Act to exactly the
kind of railroad mergers the 1893 crisis enabled had become clear.4 So
the panic of 1907-the bursting of another financial bubble-would
provide a fair test case for antitrust's mettle in the face of political pres-
sures to allow consolidation.5 There was no central bank yet-except at
the House of Morgan-and J.P. used the crisis to extend his influence
over the banking system. Roosevelt watched impotently as Morgan con-
solidated the banks, but was forced to a point of decision when Morgan
proposed to rescue the Moore & Schley brokerage house by having U.S.
Steel buy up a large interest in Tennessee Coal and Iron.6 Now Morgan
would extend his already substantial influence over both banking and
steel. 7 Eager to avoid a "general industrial smashup," Roosevelt ex-
pressed approval of the deal within twenty minutes, giving Morgan rea-
son to believe that he would enjoy antitrust immunity for the
transaction.8
The three-way 1912 election, in which antitrust was one of the defin-
ing issues, and the election of Woodrow Wilson, saw a period of substan-
tial antitrust enforcement.9 Then 1914 brought the Clayton and FTC
Acts, steered in large part by Louis Brandeis, Wilson's regulatory brain-
3 Id. at 68.
4 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
5 A comprehensive account of the 1907 crisis appears in Marc Winerman, Antitrust and
the Crisis of '07, ANrTIRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2008, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/08/12/Dec8-Winermanl2-22f.pdf.
6 EDMUND MoRRs, THEODORE REX 499 (2001).
7 Economic historians Thomas McCraw and Forest Reinhardt argue that the Tennes-
see Iron and Coal acquisition was motivated more by stabilizing the steel industry than by
expanding U.S. Steel's market power. Thomas K McCraw & Forest Reinhardt, Losing to
Win: U.S. Steel's Pricing, Investment Decisions, and Market Share, 1901-1938, 49J. ECON. HIST.
593, 604 (1989).
8 Id. See generally Winerman, supra note 5 (providing full account of Roosevelt's interac-
tion with Morgan over the Moore & Schley affair). Roosevelt's deal with Morgan became
the subject of a condemnatory report by the Congressional Stanley Committee and deep-
ened a wedge between Roosevelt and his former protfgd, William Howard Taft. Id. The
Supreme Court ultimately vindicated Roosevelt in its 1920 U.S. Steel decision. United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 446-47 (1920).
9 The Taft administration had already been active in antitrust enforcement, perhaps
even more active by some measures than Wilson's. See generally Marc Winerman, The Ori-
gins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1,
28-30 (2003).
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trust and the author of The Curse of Bigness. But U.S. entry into World
War I contributed to the termination of the Progressive experiment with
antitrust enforcement. In 1918, Attorney General Thomas Gregory
opined that antitrust law would be an impediment to the war effort, and
most major antitrust cases were suspended until the end of the war.'0
The Republican administrations of the Roaring Twenties continued
what Richard Hofstadter has called, perhaps unfairly, the "the era of
[antitrust] neglect."" Franklin Roosevelt's election created hopes for a
change in direction. Here is the part of the historical narrative that is
most discussed today. Instead of reinvigorating antitrust enforcement,
during the first half of the New Deal, from 1933-35, Roosevelt sus-
pended antitrust law through the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) and put in its place a system of industry-sponsored codes and
controls on prices and output levels.' 2 The NIRA probably prolonged
the Depression."
After the Supreme Court invalidated key portions of the NIRA in 1935
and sentiment within the New Deal coalition turned against the NIRA
system, the Roosevelt administration abruptly turned toward renewed
antitrust enforcement.' 4 The antitrust divisions of Robert Jackson and
Thurman Arnold greatly reinvigorated antitrust activity between the late
1930s and 1940, but the revival was short lived.
10 See Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile, III, Antitrust in Wartime, ANTITRUST, Spring
2002, at 71, 71-72; Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 1921-1933: An Early
Phase of a Continuing Issue, 74 IowA L. Rv. 1067, 1068 (1989); Thomas K. Fisher, Antitrust
During National Emergencies, 40 MICH. L. REv. 969, 996 (1942).
11 Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE PARANOID STYLE
IN AMERICAN POLITICS: AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 193 (1965).
12 See generally ELwis W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY. A
STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966). Between 1933 and 1935, roughly the dates of
the NIRA experiment, GDP increased about 28 percent and unemployment dropped by
about 2 million. Id. at 131. Although these figures show improvement in the national
economy compared to the preexisting state of affairs, the experiment was roundly consid-
ered a failure, particularly in light of the fact that "[o]ver ten and a half million workers
were still unemployed, approximately twenty million people were still dependent upon
relief, basic industries were still operating at little more than half their capacity, and the
real income of the average family was still thirteen percent below that of 1929." Id. at
131-32.
IS See Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great
Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779 (2004) (using multi-sector
general equilibrium model to argue that the cartelization permitted by New Deal policies
prolonged the Great Depression).
14 See Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust
in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 91 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds.,
2007).
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In 1940, while head of the Antitrust Division, Thurman Arnold pub-
lished The Bottlenecks of Business, 5 a book that defended reinvigorated
antitrust enforcement. He entitled Chapter IV, "A Free Market in Times
of National Emergency or War." Arnold wrote that " [t] he antitrust laws
must constantly defend the ideal of industrial democracy against all
sorts of pressures."' 6 With the prospect of war on his horizon, Arnold
observed that "[t]hese pressures increase when the government is sud-
denly forced to buy huge quantities of defense materials from closely
controlled sources of supply." 7 He further noted that " [t]he temptation
to exploit consumers and the government through the domination of a
suddenly expanding market is almost irresistible, and usually prevails
unless it is curbed."1 8
Arnold turned out to be writing his own political obituary. He soon
began to face the "wholesale repeal or practical nullification of antitrust
in the face of the war planning and production leading up to the U.S.
entry into World War II." 9 Consistent with the themes laid out in Bottle-
necks, Arnold continued to push aggressive antitrust enforcement as an
aid, rather than obstacle, to the war effort. But the handwriting was on
the wall. In 1942, when Arnold tried to indict Averell Harriman, the
chairman of the Union Pacific Railroad, for price fixing, he was quietly
forced out of the Justice Department and onto a seat on the federal
court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Thereafter, the Roosevelt adminis-
tration implemented formal policies allowing immunization from anti-
trust prosecution, issued guidelines for industry collaborations,
permitted pooling of small firms, and gave the Secretaries of War and
the Navy the power to toll antitrust cases until the termination of the
war.2 ° Over thirty cases were tolled.2'
A clear pattern emerges in the historical narrative from the promulga-
tion of the Sherman Act until at least the end of World War II. Antitrust
enforcement consistently gave way to greater political forces in the face
of large-scale war or economic crises.
Carl Shapiro has characterized my historical narrative as "gloomy"
and taken consolation from the fact that "much of Crane's discussion
relates to reduced antitrust enforcement during times of war rather
15 THURMAN ARNOLD, THE Bo-rLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940).
16 Id. at 60.
17 Id.
18 Id,
19 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 106 (2005).
20 Steuer & Barile, supra note 10, at 72-73.
21 Id.
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than economic distress." 22 I am not so sure that consolation is justified.
Excluding the 1893 panic as an aberration during antitrust's primordial
era, from 1890 until the end of World War II we have antitrust reces-
sions during an equal number of wars and economic crises-the two
World Wars and the 1907 panic and Great Depression.
Of course, not all wars and economic downturns are created equal.
The 1907 panic was a short-lived financial crisis with immediate effects
on only a limited number of industries, whereas the Depression was a
multi-year drain on activity throughout the economy. More significantly,
with the exception of RobertJackson's and Thurman Arnold's relatively
short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to revive and sustain anti-
trust enforcement at the tail of the Depression and beginning of the
war, we have no counterexamples of antitrust institutions standing up to
political pressures for antitrust retrenchment.
Perhaps we can take consolation from the fact that the historical nar-
rative breaks off with the revival and then normalization of antitrust en-
forcement following World War II. In my earlier essay, I offered some
very limited evidence of pressures for antitrust retrenchment during the
Korean and Vietnam wars,23 but there is no pattern of overall antitrust
retrenchment during those conflicts or in the more recent Persian Gulf,
Afghan, or Iraqi wars. Then again, those wars did not cause nearly the
domestic economic dislocations of the two World Wars. In their peak
years, World War I and World War II consumed 13.6 percent and 35.8
percent of GDP, respectively.2 4 No war in the second half of the 20th
century or early 21st century consumed more than 5 percent of GDP in
its peak year, and most were closer to 2 percent or less.25 Whatever their
human, social, political, and moral tolls, the post-World War II wars did
not rise nearly to the economic level of the great wars or economic cri-
ses and hence would not likely have exerted political pressures on ar-
cane areas of regulation like antitrust.
Of course, there were also economic crises of various sorts in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, and no correlative pattern of antitrust lax-
ity. But, like the wars of the same period, the economic dislocations
were probably just too small to count. The 1981-82 recession, 1987
2 Carl Shapiro, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Competi-
tion Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks at ABA Antitrust Section Symposium: Com-
petition as Public Policy (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/245857.htm.23 Crane, supra note 1, at 8.
24 STEPHEN DAGGETT, CONG. RES. SERV., RS 22926, COSTS OF MAJOR U.S. WARs 2 (2008),
available at http://fas.o rg/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf.
25 Id.
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stock market crash, and 1997 Asian financial crisis did not resemble the
1907 panic or the Great Depression, which were (or felt like it at the
time) existential threats to the economic order. The runaway inflation
of the late 1970s certainly occasioned political pressures on antitrust en-
forcement, but in the opposite direction from depressions or panics.
President Carter vowed to use more strenuous antitrust enforcement to
fight inflationary pressures.2 6
The tight historical narrative of inevitable antitrust retrenchment dur-
ing depressionary crises and wars fades away during the second half of
the 20th century, but arguably because the United States did not experi-
ence any triggering events of sufficient magnitude. Until recently, that
is. Given the general consensus that the 2008-09 crisis was the most se-
vere since the Depression, we may now ask whether history recurred or
was overcome by modern conditions.
II. AND HOW DID WE DO THIS TIME AROUND?
I will begin by cheating and saying that it is just too early to tell. There
is a noble tradition of writing history as it unwinds, but I will resist the
impulse to join it. Richard Posner wrote A Failure of Capitalism in late
2008, announcing that, whatever else others might call it, we were in the
middle of a depression.2 7 He observed that "Is]ome might think it pre-
mature to write about a depression before it ends and indeed before it
has reached bottom . .. [b]ut when it ends, hindsight will rewrite his-
tory."28 Less than two years later, with stocks rallying around 60 percent
from their lows, unemployment apparently leveling off to a little lower
than 10 percent, and GDP continuing to grow (albeit sluggishly), 29 it
seems like the howls that might have prompted the "D" word in 2008
have abated without the appearance of the monster. At the risk of re-
writing history, I will wait until there is a sufficient time cushion from
the recent events to declare what actually happened.
26 Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Address Delivered Before ajoint Session of the
Congress (Jan. 23, 1979), available at http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid
=32657.
2
7 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION X-Xi (2009).
28 Id. at xvi.
29 The DowJones Industrial Average bottomed out at 6,547 on March 9, 2009, and had
rallied 61 percent to 10,564 a year later. Stocks Rise on Upbeat Economic Outlook, LA TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2010. The U.S. economy grew at an annualized rate of 2.7 percent in the first
quarter of 2010 and 1.6 percent in the second quarter. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, U.S. Economy at a Glance: Perspective from the BEA Accounts,
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/glance.htm. In August 2010, the unemployment rate
was 9.6 percent. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation
Summary (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
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One reason that it is premature to diagnose whether antitrust re-
trenchment occurred during the recent crisis is that antitrust enforce-
ment has changed in one important particular since 1945-today, most
antitrust enforcement is private. There are roughly ten private cases for
every government case. Hence, total antitrust enforcement is less di-
rectly responsive to political pressures during an economic crisis than it
was in the days in which a private deal between Teddy Roosevelt and J.P.
Morgan meant effective antitrust immunity for a big corporate deal or a
tolling decision by the Secretary of War meant that the cases would
largely go away.
Private antitrust may be responsive to economic crises in several con-
flicting ways. One empirical study suggests that private antitrust en-
forcement may be counter-cyclical, with shocks to inflation, output, and
consumption having a positive effect (in varying degrees) on antitrust
enforcement. 0 The economic crisis could actually cause an increase in
private litigation. On the other hand, judges are responsive to external
political and economic conditions, as the Supreme Court clearly was in
its 1933 Appalachian Coals decision, immunizing a coal cartel from anti-
trust liability during the Depression.3 1 Even if it takes more time for the
judiciary to put the brakes on antitrust enforcement, private plaintiffs
may calculate that the expected value of their lawsuits has gone down if
they anticipate increasing conservatism (in the sense of a greater reluc-
tance to apply antitrust law) by judges in response to desperate eco-
nomic circumstances.
The effects of the recent crisis on private antitrust enforcement are
difficult to isolate from other factors, such as the Supreme Court's 2007
Twombly decision,32 although the financial crisis does seem to have had
some effect on civil antitrust filings. Data from the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts show a sharp decline in civil filings from late 2008 to
late 2009:13
30 See Lance Bachmeier et al., The Volume of Federal Litigation and the Macroeconomy, 24
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 191 (2004).
31 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
32 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
33 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Caseload Statistics, Table C2, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseload
Statistics2009.aspx.
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CIVIL ANTITRUST FILINGS IN FEDERAL COURT, FY ENDING IN
SEPTEMBER 2005-2009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
818 986 1039 1318 812
Although the 38 percent decline from year ending in September 2008
to the year ending September 2009 is dramatic, and the two periods are
separated almost exactly by the beginning of the financial crisis, it advis-
able to keep the overall trends in context before leaping to conclusions.
And what about public antitrust enforcement? Thus far, we have seen
little indication of the expansion of antitrust enforcement that President
Obama trumpeted on the campaign trail and Christine Varney prom-
ised when she became Assistant Attorney General. Apart from the Jus-
tice Department's intervention in Google Books34-a case that the DOJ
did not originate-there have not been major, headline-grabbing anti-
trust filings from the Antitrust Division. Further, there are possible signs
that more senior administration officials are containing the Antitrust Di-
vision's activities until the economy improves. In July 2009, Ms. Varney
publicly opposed Continental's joining the Star Alliance, a measure that
the Department of Transportation (DOT) approved. A New York Times
story reported that the dispute between the Antitrust Division and the
DOT became so heated that White House Economic Council director
Larry Summers had to mediate, with the DOT getting much of what it
wanted.3 5 The article further reported that some senior administration
officials "fear that the crackdown is coming at a bad time, as corporate
America reels from the recession," 6 and hinted that the White House
may be muzzling the Antitrust Division's efforts at an antitrust revival.
It is still far too early to tell whether the Justice Department's eager-
ness to get back into the game of vigorous trustbusting has been sup-
pressed by higher political forces until the economy improves or
whether the Antitrust Division is just taking its time to develop a suite of
big cases. On the other hand, economic conditions did not deter the
FTC from bringing a blockbuster case against Intel. 37 But, even there,
the effects of the recession are difficult to determine. As an indepen-
4 Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class Set-
tlement, Author's Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009),
available at http://www'justice.gov/atr/cases/authorsguild.htm.
35 Stephen Labaton, Cracking Down, Antitrust Chief Hits Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2009, at Al.
36 Id.
3 7 Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.
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dent agency, the FIC is perhaps less quickly responsive to external polit-
ical forces than the Antitrust Division.5 Had the parties not settled, the
FTC might have run up against a hostile appellate court. Many of the
markers of antitrust retrenchment during previous crises were cases that
were filed but then tolled, abandoned, or rejected by the courts.
Let me conclude my noncommittal review of the present by circling
back to the question of what counts as a sufficiently grave economic
downturn or war to trigger the previously observed retrenchment im-
pulses. It may turn out that the Great Recession did not last long
enough to have discernable effects on antitrust enforcement. With hind-
sight, any apparent antitrust retrenchment may seem like nothing other
than the tail end of a political administration that had little appetite for
blockbuster antitrust cases and the transition months of a more aggres-
sive administration that needed time to develop its big cases. A deep but
short recession in the middle of that narrative may turn out to be a
footnote to the broader antitrust story. Time will tell.
III. CONCLUSION
In her first major speech as the new Assistant Attorney General in May
2009, Christine Varney vowed that the new administration would not
forget the lessons of history.A9 She identified those lessons as follows:
"First, there is no adequate substitute for a competitive market, particu-
larly during times of economic distress. Second, vigorous antitrust en-
forcement must play a significant role in the Government's response to
economic crises to ensure that markets remain competitive.
" 40
Are those really the lessons of history? "History" does not speak di-
rectly. It is up to us to draw out the "lessons," if there are lessons to be
drawn. Although everyone loves to quote Santayana's observation that
"[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,"4 1
8The FTC is undoubtedly responsive to external political will, particularly of Congress.
See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust
Enforcement: A Historical Perspective, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM IN-
SIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 63 (RobertJ. Mackay, James C. Miller III & Bruce
Yandle eds., 1987). But its response time may be slower than that of the Antitrust Division,
which is more immediately accountable to the elected branches of government (particu-
larly the executive).
39 Christine A. Varney, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era, Remarks Prepared for the Center for
American Progress (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/245711 .htm.
4 Id.
41 GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason in Common Sense, in 1 THE LIFE OF REASON; OR THE PHASES
OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284 (1905).
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there is some danger in trying to extrapolate specific morals from his-
tory. Historian David Hackett Fischer warns against a "didactic fallacy"
of attempting "to extract specific 'lessons' from history, and to apply
them literally as policies to present problems, without regard for inter-
vening changes."42 Given that the richest instances of the interaction be-
tween crises and antitrust occurred during a fifty-some-year period that
ended sixty-some years ago, Fisher's admonition is particularly
pertinent.
Assuming that we are to draw lessons, it is far from clear what they
should be. On the one hand, a repeated pattern of antitrust failures
during major economic crises could lead to the normative conclusion
that antitrust institutions must steel their nerves and make a more vigor-
ous stand in the face of countervailing political pressures. But one could
draw a very different historical lesson. Perhaps antitrust retreat during
major crises is inevitable, and standing up in the brave tradition of Thur-
man Arnold, only to be sent packing, is a noble but futile gesture. Per-
haps antitrust officials should quietly ride out the political-economic
storms, doing incremental work at the margins of the public eye, pre-
serving capital so that they can move in quickly to clean up the wreckage
once the storm subsides.
I am not ready to commit to either of these morals as the true lesson
of history. In a few years, we will be able to look back at the recent crisis
and undertake a more objective evaluation with the benefit of distance
and data.
4 2 
DAVID HACKETr FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL
THOUGHT 157 (1970).
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